31 ideas
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 10455 | Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach] |
| 10454 | In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach] |
| 10453 | In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach] |
| 10452 | Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach] |
| 10456 | Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach] |
| 10440 | An object can be described without being referred to [Bach] |
| 10444 | Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 11993 | Jones may cease to exist without some simple property, but that doesn't make it essential [Kung] |
| 11997 | A property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another [Kung] |
| 11992 | Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 11995 | Some peripheral properties are explained by essential ones, but don't themselves explain properties [Kung] |
| 11996 | Some non-essential properties may explain more than essential-but-peripheral ones do [Kung] |
| 10446 | Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach] |
| 10447 | We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach] |
| 10443 | You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach] |
| 10439 | What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach] |
| 10441 | If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach] |
| 10442 | We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach] |
| 10445 | It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach] |
| 10457 | Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach] |
| 10463 | Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach] |
| 10459 | Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach] |
| 10460 | 'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach] |
| 10461 | What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach] |
| 10462 | Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach] |
| 10458 | People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |