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All the ideas for 'What Does It Take to Refer?', 'fragments/reports' and 'Semantic Necessity'

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31 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
10455 Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
10454 In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 3. Constants in Logic
10453 In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
14620 Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
10452 Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
10456 Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
10440 An object can be described without being referred to [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
10444 Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
12270 Being is one [Melissus, by Aristotle]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14530 The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
10446 Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach]
10447 We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach]
10443 You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
10439 What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach]
10441 If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach]
10442 We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach]
10445 It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach]
10457 Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach]
10463 Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
10459 Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach]
10460 'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach]
10461 What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach]
10462 Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
14618 Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K]
14621 Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
14622 Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
14619 The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
10458 People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
3059 There is no real motion, only the appearance of it [Melissus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
5100 The void is not required for change, because a plenum can alter in quality [Aristotle on Melissus]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
456 Nothing could come out of nothing [Melissus]