Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'What Does It Take to Refer?', 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom' and 'Identity and Necessity'

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32 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 3. Constants in Logic
In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke]
Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke]
Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
An object can be described without being referred to [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument
Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach]
We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach]
You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach]
If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach]
We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach]
It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach]
Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach]
Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach]
'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach]
What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach]
Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin]