Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'What Does It Take to Refer?', 'Leviathan' and 'Plurals and Complexes'

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81 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Resolve a complex into simple elements, then reconstruct the complex by using them [Hobbes, by MacIntyre]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The Axiom of Choice is a non-logical principle of set-theory [Hossack]
The Axiom of Choice guarantees a one-one correspondence from sets to ordinals [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Maybe we reduce sets to ordinals, rather than the other way round [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
Extensional mereology needs two definitions and two axioms [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 3. Constants in Logic
In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
An object can be described without being referred to [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach]
Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plural reference will refer to complex facts without postulating complex things [Hossack]
Plural reference is just an abbreviation when properties are distributive, but not otherwise [Hossack]
A plural comprehension principle says there are some things one of which meets some condition [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
Plural language can discuss without inconsistency things that are not members of themselves [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
The theory of the transfinite needs the ordinal numbers [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
I take the real numbers to be just lengths [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
A plural language gives a single comprehensive induction axiom for arithmetic [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
In arithmetic singularists need sets as the instantiator of numeric properties [Hossack]
Set theory is the science of infinity [Hossack]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Every part of the universe is body, and non-body is not part of it [Hobbes]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
We are committed to a 'group' of children, if they are sitting in a circle [Hossack]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Complex particulars are either masses, or composites, or sets [Hossack]
The relation of composition is indispensable to the part-whole relation for individuals [Hossack]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Leibniz's Law argues against atomism - water is wet, unlike water molecules [Hossack]
The fusion of five rectangles can decompose into more than five parts that are rectangles [Hossack]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Appearance and reality can be separated by mirrors and echoes [Hobbes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
Dreams must be false because they seem absurd, but dreams don't see waking as absurd [Hobbes]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Freedom is absence of opposition to action; the idea of 'free will' is absurd [Hobbes]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Liberty and necessity are consistent, as when water freely flows, by necessity [Hobbes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
A thought can refer to many things, but only predicate a universal and affirm a state of affairs [Hossack]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
The 'simple passions' are appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief [Hobbes, by Goldie]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach]
We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach]
You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach]
If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach]
We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach]
It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach]
Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach]
Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach]
'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach]
What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach]
Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
The will is just the last appetite before action [Hobbes]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Reason is usually general, but deliberation is of particulars [Hobbes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
'Good' is just what we desire, and 'Evil' what we hate [Hobbes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Men's natural desires are no sin, and neither are their actions, until law makes it so [Hobbes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Desire and love are the same, but in the desire the object is absent, and in love it is present [Hobbes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
All voluntary acts aim at some good for the doer [Hobbes]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Hobbes wants a contract to found morality, but shared values are needed to make a contract [MacIntyre on Hobbes]
A contract is a mutual transfer of rights [Hobbes]
The person who performs first in a contract is said to 'merit' the return, and is owed it [Hobbes]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
For Hobbes the Golden Rule concerns not doing things, whereas Jesus encourages active love [Hobbes, by Flanagan]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
In the violent state of nature, the merest suspicion is enough to justify breaking a contract [Hobbes]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 4. Value of Authority
Fear of sanctions is the only motive for acceptance of authority that Hobbes can think of [MacIntyre on Hobbes]
Suspicion will not destroy a contract, if there is a common power to enforce it [Hobbes]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
No one who admitted to not keeping contracts could ever be accepted as a citizen [Hobbes]
If there is a good reason for breaking a contract, the same reason should have stopped the making of it [Hobbes]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 7. Prisoner's Dilemma
The first performer in a contract is handing himself over to an enemy [Hobbes]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
Someone who keeps all his contracts when others are breaking them is making himself a prey to others [Hobbes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtues are a means to peaceful, sociable and comfortable living [Hobbes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Injustice is the failure to keep a contract, and justice is the constant will to give what is owed [Hobbes]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
In time of war the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short [Hobbes]
Hobbes attributed to savages the passions which arise in a law-bound society [Hobbes, by Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
Hobbes says the people voluntarily give up their sovereignty, in a contract with a ruler [Hobbes, by Oksala]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
There is not enough difference between people for one to claim more benefit than another [Hobbes]
Hobbes says people are roughly equal; Locke says there is no right to impose inequality [Hobbes, by Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
If we seek peace and defend ourselves, we must compromise on our rights [Hobbes]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
We should obey the laws of nature, provided other people are also obeying them [Hobbes, by Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
The legal positivism of Hobbes said law is just formal or procedural [Hobbes, by Jolley]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Punishment should only be for reform or deterrence [Hobbes]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
If fear of unknown powers is legal it is religion, if it is illegal it is superstition [Hobbes]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Causation is only observation of similar events following each other, with nothing visible in between [Hobbes]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
We could ignore space, and just talk of the shape of matter [Hossack]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion is built on ignorance and misinterpretation of what is unknown or frightening [Hobbes]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Belief in an afterlife is based on poorly founded gossip [Hobbes]