83 ideas
20744 | Phenomenologists say all experience is about something and is directed [Aho] |
3508 | Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry [Searle] |
4901 | Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry] |
3473 | Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle] |
3532 | Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle] |
3533 | Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin] |
3454 | Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle] |
3471 | Some properties depend on components, others on their relations [Searle] |
3472 | Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation [Searle] |
4885 | Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry] |
4899 | Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry] |
4898 | Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry] |
3490 | Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs [Searle] |
3491 | Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background [Searle] |
3482 | Perception is a function of expectation [Searle] |
3493 | Memory is mainly a guide for current performance [Searle] |
20736 | Science has to abstract out the subjective attributes of things, focusing on what is objective [Aho] |
4887 | We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry] |
3463 | We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle] |
3457 | Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle] |
3480 | We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle] |
4884 | Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry] |
3479 | The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle] |
3470 | Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle] |
4888 | It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry] |
3486 | Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle] |
3503 | Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle] |
3465 | Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle] |
3484 | Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle] |
3489 | Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle] |
3494 | Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle] |
3481 | Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle] |
4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle] |
3467 | Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle] |
3483 | Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle] |
3468 | I cannot observe my own subjectivity [Searle] |
3469 | Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle] |
4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
3487 | Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle] |
3458 | Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle] |
3485 | Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle] |
3461 | Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle] |
3496 | A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle] |
3499 | Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle] |
3501 | If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle] |
3456 | Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle] |
3453 | Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle] |
3455 | Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle] |
3475 | Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle] |
3476 | Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle] |
3477 | If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle] |
3531 | Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle] |
3478 | Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle] |
3466 | Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle] |
3500 | Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle] |
9317 | Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford] |
3474 | If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle] |
4900 | Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry] |
3497 | If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle] |
4892 | If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry] |
3462 | We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it [Searle] |
3498 | Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena [Searle] |
3492 | Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle] |
4889 | Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry] |
3464 | There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle] |
3506 | We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle] |
4896 | The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry] |
3451 | Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle] |
3450 | Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind [Searle] |
3507 | Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything [Searle] |
4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
4890 | A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry] |
3495 | Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard [Searle] |
3505 | The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do [Searle] |
20734 | Anxiety, nausea, guilt and absurdity shake us up, revealing our freedom and limits [Aho] |
20733 | Our 'existence' is how we create ourselves, unconstrained by any prior 'essence' [Aho] |
20753 | The self is constituted by its choices made within a social context [Aho] |
20738 | Social contracts and markets have made society seem disconnected and artificial [Aho] |
3504 | Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle] |
3502 | Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating [Searle] |
3459 | You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit [Searle] |
20737 | Protestantism brought the modern emphasis on inner states of the soul [Aho] |
20766 | Four Noble Truths: life is suffering, caused by attachment, it is avoidable, there is a path [Aho] |