60 ideas
| 5196 | Philosophy is a department of logic [Ayer] |
| 5189 | Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical [Ayer] |
| 7919 | Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics [Ayer, by Macdonald,C] |
| 5195 | Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration [Ayer] |
| 5179 | Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle [Ayer] |
| 4749 | We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted [Ayer] |
| 15592 | The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K] |
| 15593 | Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K] |
| 15590 | It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K] |
| 15591 | In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K] |
| 15595 | The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K] |
| 15594 | 'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K] |
| 15599 | Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K] |
| 5202 | Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological [Ayer] |
| 6523 | Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
| 15603 | I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K] |
| 15604 | If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K] |
| 5183 | Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable [Ayer] |
| 6525 | Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer] |
| 5170 | Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer] |
| 5198 | We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things [Ierubino on Ayer] |
| 2619 | Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry [Ayer] |
| 5197 | By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction [Ayer] |
| 5204 | To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology [Ayer] |
| 6524 | Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
| 5193 | Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables [Ayer] |
| 5200 | The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge [Ayer] |
| 4729 | Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic [O'Grady on Ayer] |
| 5180 | All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses [Ayer] |
| 5169 | My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage [Ayer] |
| 5185 | It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience [Ayer] |
| 5199 | Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths [Ayer] |
| 5190 | The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past [Ayer] |
| 5191 | We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular [Ayer] |
| 5177 | Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer] |
| 5178 | A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer] |
| 5172 | If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer] |
| 5173 | Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body [Ayer] |
| 5176 | Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents [Ayer] |
| 5171 | The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances' [Ayer] |
| 15602 | Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K] |
| 15588 | You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K] |
| 5181 | A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition [Ayer] |
| 5184 | Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences [Ayer] |
| 5186 | Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions [Ayer] |
| 15596 | The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K] |
| 15587 | That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K] |
| 15589 | The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K] |
| 15598 | We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K] |
| 15600 | Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K] |
| 15601 | Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K] |
| 15605 | I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K] |
| 5205 | Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions [Ayer] |
| 23725 | Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M] |
| 5206 | To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer] |
| 8991 | Foucault can't accept that power is sometimes decent and benign [Foucault, by Scruton] |
| 5208 | A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible. [Ayer] |
| 5187 | When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists [Ayer] |
| 5207 | If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism. [Ayer] |
| 5209 | The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant [Ayer] |