11 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
22664 | I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick] |
22665 | Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
3568 | Surely ALL truths are externally justified, by the facts? [Cross,A] |
22662 | In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick] |
22663 | Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick] |
22666 | Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick] |
22667 | Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |