61 ideas
12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis] |
15169 | Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it) [Sidelle] |
10571 | Concern for rigour can get in the way of understanding phenomena [Fine,K] |
15164 | We seem to base necessities on thought experiments and imagination [Sidelle] |
10565 | There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated [Fine,K] |
10564 | We might combine the axioms of set theory with the axioms of mereology [Fine,K] |
12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis] |
10569 | If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order [Fine,K] |
10570 | Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K] |
10573 | Dedekind cuts lead to the bizarre idea that there are many different number 1's [Fine,K] |
10575 | Why should a Dedekind cut correspond to a number? [Fine,K] |
10574 | Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions [Fine,K] |
12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis] |
10560 | Set-theoretic imperialists think sets can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
10568 | Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way [Fine,K] |
12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis] |
10563 | A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K] |
12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis] |
12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis] |
12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis] |
12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis] |
12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE] |
12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
15180 | There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts [Sidelle] |
12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis] |
15184 | Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle] |
12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
15172 | Clearly, essential predications express necessary properties [Sidelle] |
15181 | Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property [Sidelle] |
15173 | That the essence of water is its microstructure is a convention, not a discovery [Sidelle] |
15185 | We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle] |
15175 | Evaluation of de dicto modalities does not depend on the identity of its objects [Sidelle] |
12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis] |
12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis] |
15032 | Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sidelle, by Sider] |
15179 | To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary [Sidelle] |
15171 | The necessary a posteriori is statements either of identity or of essence [Sidelle] |
15167 | Empiricism explores necessities and concept-limits by imagining negations of truths [Sidelle] |
15177 | Contradictoriness limits what is possible and what is imaginable [Sidelle] |
15176 | The individuals and kinds involved in modality are also a matter of convention [Sidelle] |
15174 | A thing doesn't need transworld identity prior to rigid reference - that could be a convention of the reference [Sidelle] |
15183 | 'Dthat' operates to make a singular term into a rigid term [Sidelle] |
15165 | A priori knowledge is entirely of analytic truths [Sidelle] |
12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis] |
15168 | That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water' [Sidelle] |
10561 | Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think Fregean abstracts can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
10562 | We can combine ZF sets with abstracts as urelements [Fine,K] |
10567 | We can create objects from conditions, rather than from concepts [Fine,K] |
15166 | Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open [Sidelle] |
15182 | Because some entities overlap, reference must have analytic individuation principles [Sidelle] |
12681 | There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis] |
12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis] |
15178 | Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers? [Sidelle] |
12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis] |
12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis] |
12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis] |