Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Question of Realism', 'Necessity, Essence and Individuation' and 'Notes on Comments by Fardella'

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41 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
15053 If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
15169 Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it) [Sidelle]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
15054 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
15164 We seem to base necessities on thought experiments and imagination [Sidelle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
15007 If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K]
15006 Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
15055 Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
15050 Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K]
15051 Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K]
15052 Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K]
15056 The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
15060 Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K]
15046 Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K]
15047 What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K]
15048 In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
15180 There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts [Sidelle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
13160 To exist and be understood, a multitude must first be reduced to a unity [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13161 Substances are everywhere in matter, like points in a line [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
15184 Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
15172 Clearly, essential predications express necessary properties [Sidelle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
15181 Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property [Sidelle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
15173 That the essence of water is its microstructure is a convention, not a discovery [Sidelle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
15185 We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
15175 Evaluation of de dicto modalities does not depend on the identity of its objects [Sidelle]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
15032 Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sidelle, by Sider]
15179 To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary [Sidelle]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
15171 The necessary a posteriori is statements either of identity or of essence [Sidelle]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
15167 Empiricism explores necessities and concept-limits by imagining negations of truths [Sidelle]
15177 Contradictoriness limits what is possible and what is imaginable [Sidelle]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
15176 The individuals and kinds involved in modality are also a matter of convention [Sidelle]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
15174 A thing doesn't need transworld identity prior to rigid reference - that could be a convention of the reference [Sidelle]
15183 'Dthat' operates to make a singular term into a rigid term [Sidelle]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
15165 A priori knowledge is entirely of analytic truths [Sidelle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
15061 Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
15059 Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
15057 Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
15168 That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water' [Sidelle]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
15166 Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open [Sidelle]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
15182 Because some entities overlap, reference must have analytic individuation principles [Sidelle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
15058 A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
15178 Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers? [Sidelle]