22 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
17377 | All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré] |
17376 | We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré] |
17390 | Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré] |
17389 | A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré] |
17388 | It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré] |
17374 | The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré] |
17378 | Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
20919 | How can things without weight compose weight? [Alexander] |
17381 | Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré] |
17385 | Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré] |
17380 | Wales may count as fish [Dupré] |
17382 | Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré] |
17375 | Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré] |
17379 | Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré] |
17384 | Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré] |
17387 | Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré] |
17386 | The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré] |
17383 | Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré] |