14 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
10153 | In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski] |
19141 | Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson] |
10048 | There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski] |
10694 | Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall] |
10479 | Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W] |
10157 | Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
3539 | Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin] |
1393 | One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit] |
1392 | If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit] |
1391 | Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |