Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Question of Ontology', 'Actualism and Possible Worlds' and 'Entity and Identity'

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18 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
12215 The existence of numbers is not a matter of identities, but of constituents of the world [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
12211 It is plausible that x^2 = -1 had no solutions before complex numbers were 'introduced' [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
12209 The indispensability argument shows that nature is non-numerical, not the denial of numbers [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
12214 'Exists' is a predicate, not a quantifier; 'electrons exist' is like 'electrons spin' [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
14664 Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
12212 Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
12216 Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality [Fine,K]
12218 Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
12217 For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
12213 Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification [Fine,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
16980 We need a logical use of 'object' as predicate-worthy, and an 'ontological' use [Strawson,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
14666 Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
16979 It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual [Strawson,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
14662 Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
16472 Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
16469 Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
16470 Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
14663 Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]