Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism', 'talk' and 'Necessity and Non-Existence'

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22 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K]
Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K]
You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K]
The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
Culture is the struggle to agree what is normal [Gibson,A]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K]
It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K]