9 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
3913 | Maybe imagination is the source of a priori justification [Casullo] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |