Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction'', 'Intuitionism: an Introduction' and 'First Things First'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

9 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
10528 Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
10529 If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K]
10530 Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
8754 Logic is dependent on mathematics, not the other way round [Heyting, by Shapiro]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19520 Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19521 If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee]
19522 More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee]
19523 Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10527 An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K]