65 ideas
17275 | Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K] |
12274 | Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle] |
8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
12260 | Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle] |
12291 | There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle] |
12292 | Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle] |
12261 | Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle] |
12263 | 'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle] |
12272 | We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle] |
12279 | The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle] |
12283 | In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle] |
12289 | The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle] |
12285 | The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle] |
17282 | Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K] |
17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
17286 | Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K] |
11261 | Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle] |
12273 | Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle] |
8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
17272 | 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K] |
17276 | If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K] |
17284 | An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K] |
17285 | 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K] |
17288 | We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K] |
17281 | If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K] |
17280 | Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K] |
17290 | Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K] |
17274 | Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K] |
17278 | We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K] |
17287 | Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K] |
12267 | There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle] |
12282 | An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle] |
12264 | An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle] |
12280 | Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle] |
13269 | In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle] |
12284 | Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle] |
12262 | An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle] |
17279 | Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K] |
12290 | Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle] |
12286 | If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle] |
12266 | 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle] |
12287 | Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle] |
12288 | Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle] |
12259 | Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle] |
17289 | Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K] |
17273 | Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K] |
8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
12271 | Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle] |
12293 | We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle] |
17291 | We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K] |
17271 | Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K] |
17277 | If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K] |
12276 | Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle] |
12277 | Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle] |
12275 | We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle] |
12281 | Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle] |
12265 | All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle] |
12278 | 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle] |