Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction'', 'The Metaontology of Abstraction' and 'Rationality in Action'

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48 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
3811 Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle]
3822 Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
3812 Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle]
3806 Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
10528 Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
12223 It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
3809 If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
12230 Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
3810 In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
10529 If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K]
10530 Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
12225 Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
12224 Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
3841 Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
12226 The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
12229 Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
18443 A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
3837 We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle]
3816 Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle]
3833 A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
3828 Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
3831 Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
3830 In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
3832 Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
3823 Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
3821 Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle]
3824 A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle]
3834 An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
3825 Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
3826 A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle]
3829 Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
3827 The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
3820 The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
3808 Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle]
3817 Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle]
3818 We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
12227 Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright]
12228 Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright]
10527 An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
12231 Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
3814 Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
3840 We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
3815 The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle]
3839 Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
3835 If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle]
3836 If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
3838 Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
3813 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle]