24 ideas
10571 | Concern for rigour can get in the way of understanding phenomena [Fine,K] |
7807 | The laws of thought are true, but they are not the axioms of logic [Bolzano, by George/Van Evra] |
10565 | There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated [Fine,K] |
10564 | We might combine the axioms of set theory with the axioms of mereology [Fine,K] |
10569 | If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order [Fine,K] |
10570 | Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K] |
9618 | Bolzano wanted to reduce all of geometry to arithmetic [Bolzano, by Brown,JR] |
10573 | Dedekind cuts lead to the bizarre idea that there are many different number 1's [Fine,K] |
10575 | Why should a Dedekind cut correspond to a number? [Fine,K] |
10574 | Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions [Fine,K] |
10560 | Set-theoretic imperialists think sets can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
9830 | Bolzano began the elimination of intuition, by proving something which seemed obvious [Bolzano, by Dummett] |
10568 | Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way [Fine,K] |
17265 | Philosophical proofs in mathematics establish truths, and also show their grounds [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder] |
10563 | A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K] |
9185 | Bolzano wanted to avoid Kantian intuitions, and prove everything that could be proved [Bolzano, by Dummett] |
8044 | Goffman sees the self as no more than a peg on which to hang roles we play [Goffman, by MacIntyre] |
10561 | Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think Fregean abstracts can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
10562 | We can combine ZF sets with abstracts as urelements [Fine,K] |
10567 | We can create objects from conditions, rather than from concepts [Fine,K] |
22276 | Bolzano saw propositions as objective entities, existing independently of us [Bolzano, by Potter] |
17264 | Propositions are abstract structures of concepts, ready for judgement or assertion [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder] |
12232 | A 'proposition' is the sense of a linguistic expression, and can be true or false [Bolzano] |
12233 | The ground of a pure conceptual truth is only in other conceptual truths [Bolzano] |