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All the ideas for 'Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction'', 'Vagueness' and 'Grounding: an opinionated introduction'

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12 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false [Russell, by Williamson]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K]
Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic [Russell, by Keefe/Smith]
Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language [Russell]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K]