Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ontological Dependence', 'Human Knowledge: its scope and limits' and 'Introduction to Virtue Ethics'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K]
A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K]
An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K]
Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K]
Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
We may still admire a person's character even if the traits are involuntary [Statman]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
There is a new sort of moral scepticism, about the possibility of moral theories [Statman]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
With a broad concept of flourishing, it might be possible without the virtues [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue theory isn't a genuine ethical theory, because it doesn't have universal application [Statman]
Promises create moral duties that have nothing to do with character [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Moral education is better by concrete example than abstract principle [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Friends express friendship even when no utility is involved [Statman]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Behaviour may be disgusting or inhumane, but violate no duty [Statman]
The ancients recognised imperfect duties, but we have added perfect duties like justice [Statman]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Abortion issues focus on the mother's right over her body, and the status of the foetus [Statman]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos]