12 ideas
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 21560 | Any linguistic expression may lack meaning when taken out of context [Russell] |
| 21561 | 'The number one is bald' or 'the number one is fond of cream cheese' are meaningless [Russell] |
| 19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
| 18130 | Axiom of Reducibility: there is always a function of the lowest possible order in a given level [Russell, by Bostock] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 21562 | There is no complexity without relations, so no propositions, and no truth [Russell] |
| 6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
| 6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
| 6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |