19 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
21544 | It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell] |
21539 | Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
21538 | If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell] |
21534 | The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell] |
21540 | Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell] |
21536 | When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell] |
21535 | Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell] |
21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
21537 | I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell] |
21532 | Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell] |
13165 | Geometrical proofs do not show causes, as when we prove a triangle contains two right angles [Proclus] |
21542 | Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell] |
21541 | The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell] |
9569 | The origin of geometry started in sensation, then moved to calculation, and then to reason [Proclus] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
21543 | If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell] |