13 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
6417 | In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object [Russell, by Grayling] |
6474 | Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell] |
6476 | We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell] |
2792 | It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories [Russell] |
8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
8792 | Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars] |
22326 | Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate [Russell] |
6475 | In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar [Russell] |
8791 | The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |