14 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
15102 | S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron] |
9358 | There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI] |
9357 | Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI] |
9364 | Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
9362 | Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI] |
15103 | Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron] |
9365 | We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI] |
9361 | We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
9363 | Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI] |
15104 | The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron] |