8 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
7803 | Modal logic began with translation difficulties for 'If...then' [Lewis,CI, by Girle] |
5691 | The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly' [Shoemaker] |
5687 | For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker] |
5688 | Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |