9 ideas
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 15335 | Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce] |
| 14796 | Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 12739 | If we are dreaming, it is sufficient that the events are coherent, and obey laws [Leibniz] |
| 14795 | Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce] |
| 12738 | Successful prediction shows proficiency in nature [Leibniz] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |