11 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
14303 | Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false [Peirce] |
17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |
17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |