Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction'', 'Pragmatism in Retrospect' and 'The Mystery of Consciousness'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
10528 Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
15335 Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce]
14796 Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
10529 If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K]
10530 Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
5791 Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle]
5799 Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
5790 A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
14795 Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
5792 Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
5786 A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
5794 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
5795 There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
5788 The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
5789 I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
5798 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
5787 There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
5797 The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
5796 If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10527 An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K]