Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Question of Realism', 'The Nature of Mathematics' and 'Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics'

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31 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K]
Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K]
Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K]
Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K]
The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K]
What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K]
In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K]
Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality [Strawson,P]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied [Strawson,P]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce]