15 ideas
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 10476 | The idea that groups of concepts could be 'implicitly defined' was abandoned [Hodges,W] |
| 15335 | Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce] |
| 14796 | Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce] |
| 10478 | Since first-order languages are complete, |= and |- have the same meaning [Hodges,W] |
| 10477 | |= in model-theory means 'logical consequence' - it holds in all models [Hodges,W] |
| 10474 | |= should be read as 'is a model for' or 'satisfies' [Hodges,W] |
| 10473 | Model theory studies formal or natural language-interpretation using set-theory [Hodges,W] |
| 10475 | A 'structure' is an interpretation specifying objects and classes of quantification [Hodges,W] |
| 10481 | Models in model theory are structures, not sets of descriptions [Hodges,W] |
| 10480 | First-order logic can't discriminate between one infinite cardinal and another [Hodges,W] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 14795 | Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |