9 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
14592 | Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer] |
14594 | Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer] |
14595 | Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer] |
14593 | Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
18555 | The beautiful is that from which nothing can be subtracted and to which nothing can be added [Alberti] |