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All the ideas for 'Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction'', 'lectures' and 'The Metaontology of Abstraction'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
10571 Concern for rigour can get in the way of understanding phenomena [Fine,K]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
12223 It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
10565 There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated [Fine,K]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
10564 We might combine the axioms of set theory with the axioms of mereology [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
12230 Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
10569 If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
10570 Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
10573 Dedekind cuts lead to the bizarre idea that there are many different number 1's [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
10575 Why should a Dedekind cut correspond to a number? [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero
10574 Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
10560 Set-theoretic imperialists think sets can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
10568 Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
12225 Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
12224 Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
10563 A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
12226 The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
12229 Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
18443 A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
8417 Direct realism is false, because defeasibility questions are essential to perceptual knowledge [Galloway]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
12227 Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright]
12228 Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright]
10561 Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think Fregean abstracts can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K]
10562 We can combine ZF sets with abstracts as urelements [Fine,K]
10567 We can create objects from conditions, rather than from concepts [Fine,K]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
12231 Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright]