14 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
17697 | The existence of an arbitrarily large number refutes the idea that numbers come from experience [Hilbert] |
17698 | Logic already contains some arithmetic, so the two must be developed together [Hilbert] |
11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson] |
6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson] |
6392 | Thought depends on speech [Davidson] |
6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson] |
11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |