Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction'', 'On the Foundations of Logic and Arithmetic' and 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver)'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

16 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
10528 Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
19125 If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
19128 If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
19120 Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19127 The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
19124 A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh]
19126 If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
19129 The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
19130 KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
10529 If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K]
10530 Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
17697 The existence of an arbitrarily large number refutes the idea that numbers come from experience [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
17698 Logic already contains some arithmetic, so the two must be developed together [Hilbert]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
19121 We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
19122 Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10527 An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K]