14 ideas
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 10825 | The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others [Field,H] |
| 10820 | In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific [Field,H] |
| 13499 | Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation [Field,H, by Hart,WD] |
| 10818 | Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions [Field,H] |
| 10817 | Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions [Field,H] |
| 10819 | Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H] |
| 10827 | Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers [Field,H] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 10826 | 'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
| 7615 | Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam] |
| 7636 | It can't be more rational to believe in natural laws than miracles if the laws are not rational [Ishaq on Hume] |