14 ideas
| 12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K] |
| 14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K] |
| 11970 | Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan] |
| 19043 | Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object [Quine] |
| 14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K] |
| 19042 | Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined [Quine] |
| 14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K] |
| 14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K] |
| 11969 | Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan] |
| 11971 | The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan] |
| 11973 | Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan] |
| 11972 | Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan] |
| 11967 | Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan] |
| 14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K] |