34 ideas
6420 | Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell] |
6432 | Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell] |
6437 | The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell] |
6442 | Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell] |
6436 | I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell] |
7528 | Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell] |
6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
12215 | The existence of numbers is not a matter of identities, but of constituents of the world [Fine,K] |
12211 | It is plausible that x^2 = -1 had no solutions before complex numbers were 'introduced' [Fine,K] |
12209 | The indispensability argument shows that nature is non-numerical, not the denial of numbers [Fine,K] |
6423 | We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell] |
6424 | Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell] |
6425 | Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell] |
6426 | Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell] |
12214 | 'Exists' is a predicate, not a quantifier; 'electrons exist' is like 'electrons spin' [Fine,K] |
12212 | Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts [Fine,K] |
12216 | Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality [Fine,K] |
12218 | Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible [Fine,K] |
6419 | In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell] |
6438 | Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell] |
12217 | For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K] |
6434 | Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell] |
12213 | Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification [Fine,K] |
6440 | Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell] |
6430 | In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell] |
6441 | Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell] |
6431 | Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell] |
6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
6433 | Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell] |
7441 | Experiences are defined by their causal role, and causal roles belong to physical states [Lewis] |
7442 | 'Pain' contingently names the state that occupies the causal role of pain [Lewis] |
6443 | Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell] |
6427 | Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell] |
6435 | You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell] |