16 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
17498 | In the 'received view' models are formal; the 'semantic view' emphasises representation [Portides, by PG] |
17499 | Theoretical models can represent, by mapping onto the data-models [Portides] |
17496 | 'Model' belongs in a family of concepts, with representation, idealisation and abstraction [Portides] |
17501 | Representational success in models depends on success of their explanations [Portides] |
17502 | The best model of the atomic nucleus is the one which explains the most results [Portides] |
17497 | Models are theory-driven, or phenomenological (more empirical and specific) [Portides] |
17500 | General theories may be too abstract to actually explain the mechanisms [Portides] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |