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All the ideas for 'Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction'', 'Putnam's Paradox' and 'Non-Monotonic Logic'

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19 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
10528 Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
19115 You can 'rebut' an argument's conclusion, or 'undercut' its premises [Antonelli]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 1. Nonclassical Logics
19119 We infer that other objects are like some exceptional object, if they share some of its properties [Antonelli]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 12. Non-Monotonic Logic
19111 Reasoning may be defeated by new premises, or by finding out more about the given ones [Antonelli]
19114 Should we accept Floating Conclusions, derived from two arguments in conflict? [Antonelli]
19113 Weakest Link Principle: prefer the argument whose weakest link is the stronger [Antonelli]
19116 Non-monotonic core: Reflexivity, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening [Antonelli]
19117 We can rank a formula by the level of surprise if it were to hold [Antonelli]
19118 People don't actually use classical logic, but may actually use non-monotonic logic [Antonelli]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
14212 A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
19110 In classical logic the relation |= has Monotony built into its definition [Antonelli]
19112 Cautious Monotony ignores proved additions; Rational Monotony fails if the addition's negation is proved [Antonelli]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
10529 If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K]
10530 Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
14213 Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14210 A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10527 An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14215 Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
14209 Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]