13 ideas
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 15533 | We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis] |
| 15534 | We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties [Lewis] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 15532 | 'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis] |
| 15535 | We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis] |
| 13169 | I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz] |
| 13168 | My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz] |
| 13170 | The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz] |
| 13171 | Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
| 13167 | We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz] |