10 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
11074 | 'It is true that this follows' means simply: this follows [Wittgenstein] |
15533 | We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis] |
15534 | We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties [Lewis] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
11073 | Two and one making three has the necessity of logical inference [Wittgenstein] |
15532 | 'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis] |
15535 | We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |