17 ideas
22334 | Analysis must include definitions, search for simples, concept analysis, and Kant's analysis [Glock] |
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
17325 | Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins] |
17318 | Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
17320 | Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins] |
17326 | The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins] |
17327 | Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins] |
17322 | Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins] |
22332 | German and British idealism is not about individual ideas, but the intelligibility of reality [Glock] |
17324 | 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins] |
17321 | Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins] |
17323 | If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins] |
22335 | The variety of uses of 'game' may be that it has several meanings, and isn't a single concept [Glock] |
22336 | We might say that the family resemblance is just a consequence of meaning-as-use [Glock] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |