11 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
14626 | In S5 matters of possibility and necessity are non-contingent [Williamson] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
14625 | Necessity is counterfactually implied by its negation; possibility does not counterfactually imply its negation [Williamson] |
14623 | Strict conditionals imply counterfactual conditionals: □(A⊃B)⊃(A□→B) [Williamson] |
14624 | Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B) [Williamson] |
14531 | Rather than define counterfactuals using necessity, maybe necessity is a special case of counterfactuals [Williamson, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
12583 | Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur [Papineau] |
14628 | Imagination is important, in evaluating possibility and necessity, via counterfactuals [Williamson] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |