38 ideas
9208 | Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K] |
4986 | A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R] |
9210 | Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K] |
9211 | A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K] |
12056 | An ancestral relation is either direct or transitively indirect [Wiggins] |
12050 | Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins] |
9202 | Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K] |
12052 | We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other' [Wiggins] |
12055 | Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?' [Wiggins] |
12059 | A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river [Wiggins] |
12063 | Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals [Wiggins] |
12051 | If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances [Wiggins] |
12053 | 'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees [Wiggins] |
12054 | Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations [Wiggins] |
12047 | We refer to persisting substances, in perception and in thought, and they aid understanding [Wiggins] |
12057 | Matter underlies things, composes things, and brings them to be [Wiggins] |
9206 | We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K] |
9205 | The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K] |
9209 | Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K] |
9200 | Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K] |
12064 | The category of substance is more important for epistemology than for ontology [Wiggins] |
12049 | Naming the secondary substance provides a mass of general information [Wiggins] |
5001 | Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R] |
4993 | If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R] |
5000 | Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R] |
12065 | Seeing a group of soldiers as an army is irresistible, in ontology and explanation [Wiggins] |
4982 | Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R] |
4991 | Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R] |
4994 | Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R] |
4992 | In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R] |
4990 | The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R] |
4984 | All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R] |
4998 | Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R] |
4985 | If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R] |
4997 | It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R] |
4999 | For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R] |
4995 | Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R] |
9207 | If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K] |