13 ideas
| 9184 | We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson] |
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 9183 | Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist [Williamson] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |