Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Semantic Relationism', 'Locke on Human Understanding' and 'Utilitarianism'

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42 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
15592 The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K]
15593 Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K]
15590 It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K]
15591 In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K]
15595 The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K]
15594 'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
15599 Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
7720 Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
7712 On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
15603 I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
15604 If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7710 Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
7711 Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
7714 Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
7715 Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
15602 Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
15588 You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
7722 If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
15596 The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K]
15587 That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K]
15589 The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K]
15598 We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K]
15600 Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K]
15601 Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
15605 I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
3772 The will, in the beginning, is entirely produced by desire [Mill]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
3769 With early training, any absurdity or evil may be given the power of conscience [Mill]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
3767 Motive shows the worth of the agent, but not of the action [Mill]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
3771 Virtues only have value because they achieve some further end [Mill]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
3768 Orthodox morality is the only one which feels obligatory [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
3764 Actions are right if they promote pleasure, wrong if they promote pain [Mill]
3776 Utilitarianism only works if everybody has a totally equal right to happiness [Mill]
7202 The English believe in the task of annihilating evil for the victory of good [Nietzsche on Mill]
5935 Mill's qualities of pleasure is an admission that there are other good states of mind than pleasure [Ross on Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
3766 Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied [Mill]
3765 Only pleasure and freedom from pain are desirable as ends [Mill]
3763 Ultimate goods such as pleasure can never be proved to be good [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
3770 General happiness is only desirable because individuals desire their own happiness [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
6697 Moral rules protecting human welfare are more vital than local maxims [Mill]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
3773 No individual has the right to receive our benevolence [Mill]
3774 Rights are a matter of justice, not of benevolence [Mill]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
3775 A right is a valid claim to society's protection [Mill]