13 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
19555 | People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee] |
19557 | Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge [Conee] |
19556 | Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards [Conee] |
18076 | Most theories are continually falsified [Kuhn, by Kitcher] |
22191 | Kuhn's scientists don't aim to falsifying their paradigm, because that is what they rely on [Kuhn, by Gorham] |
22183 | Switching scientific paradigms is a conversion experience [Kuhn] |
6162 | Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions [Rowlands on Kuhn] |
22184 | Incommensurability assumes concepts get their meaning from within the theory [Kuhn, by Okasha] |
7619 | Galileo's notions can't be 'incommensurable' if we can fully describe them [Putnam on Kuhn] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |