Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Semantic Relationism', 'The New Organon' and 'Mind in a Physical World'

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43 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
2319 Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
15592 The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K]
15593 Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K]
15590 It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K]
15591 In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K]
15595 The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K]
15594 'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
15599 Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
2317 Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
2310 Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
2315 Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
2329 Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
2320 Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
16639 Only individual bodies exist [Bacon]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
16033 There are only individual bodies containing law-based powers, and the Forms are these laws [Bacon]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
15603 I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
15604 If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
530 There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim]
13314 Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
2065 Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim]
1550 Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
21950 Science must clear away the idols of the mind if they are ever going to find the truth [Bacon]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
2318 Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2325 It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2324 Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
2314 Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
2313 Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim]
2328 The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
2309 Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim]
2311 Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
2308 Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
2322 Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
2327 Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
2323 Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
15602 Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
15588 You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
15596 The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K]
15587 That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K]
15589 The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K]
15598 We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K]
15600 Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K]
15601 Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
15605 I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K]