9 ideas
6409 | The 'simple theory of types' distinguishes levels among properties [Ramsey, by Grayling] |
16755 | The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Fine,K, by Pasnau] |
3212 | Beliefs are maps by which we steer [Ramsey] |
2848 | Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink] |
2851 | Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink] |
2853 | Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink] |
2852 | Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink] |
2849 | Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink] |
2850 | How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink] |