14 ideas
12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K] |
14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K] |
12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K] |
14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
8495 | The distinction between particulars and universals is a mistake made because of language [Ramsey] |
8493 | We could make universals collections of particulars, or particulars collections of their qualities [Ramsey] |
8494 | Obviously 'Socrates is wise' and 'Socrates has wisdom' express the same fact [Ramsey] |
14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K] |
14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K] |
18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K] |
4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |